‘Et tu Brute’ – The Inside Story
December 22, 2009 —
The following article is an in-depth analysis of the grand strategic-level virtues that led the island nation of Sri Lanka into a feat which was once defined as un-winnable; a distant goal. The writer provides us with a glimpse into a vision made real, a mission achieved…
A leader is a leader only when he has a team and a mission to be shared with his team. The inseparable bond between the leader, the team, and the mission is fundamental to all leaders whether he is a ring leader or a national leader. What makes one a national leader is the nobility of his mission. He who wants to be a national leader must commit himself to a mission that benefits the whole nation. When a leader detaches himself from the mission as well as from his team, and decides to follow a path leading to self-serving purposes, his leadership comes to an end.
Unfortunately, in this country, we have seen many leaders, once respected by all, later reduced to disrespected figures because of power politics. The reason is quite clear if one looks closely at how things had transpired in the lives of such ill-fated leaders. It is the replacement of a noble mission with a self-serving one. The saddest part of their stories is that most of them have met their fate because they let others exploit their weaknesses, allowing themselves to be dragged blindfolded into making wrong decisions. The pandemonium about General Sarath Fonseka coming into politics as the common presidential candidate can also be seen in that context; perhaps among many other views.
The writer of this article is neither a great fan of General Fonseka nor a panegyrist of the Government. Yet, he was a key role player of a unit, though little known to public, which provided a very valuable service to the team that rescued the nation from the horrors of terrorism.
He uses the word “TEAM” with a great emphasis because the whole operation that brought the victory to the Motherland was indeed a team game that no one can claim individual credit for. It was a perfect combination of individual competencies synergized by a compelling vision that transpired beyond self-serving needs. It was a battle worth fighting for, an opportunity to reach the highest self-efficacy, and a fulfilling of duty of manhood. It was fought for future generations, and for our children – to give them a peaceful, terror-free country that we had not seen during our childhood.
This effort is not to find fault with General Fonseka or to question his right to compete for the presidential election. The writer truly wishes that he would never have to pen this out. This is written out of desperation, knowing the dire implication that would be fall upon the Armed Forces, and the whole nation by a single wrong assumption made either by General Fonseka or by the citizens of this country. The victory over terrorism is certainly not General Fonseka’s individual achievement.
Thus, no soldier, sailor, or airman in this country wants to be a political football to be kicked over and over by selfish politicians. This effort is purely to prove, with facts, why one should not betray such a great team that he was once part of, purely because of selfish objectives. If he does so, he is not only betraying the noble mission, but also desecrating the sacrifices made by all in accomplishing the mission.
As mentioned earlier, the humanitarian operation that brought freedom to the country was a team game. Yet, contributions made individually certainly have their differences. Principally, four levels of contributions/contributors can be identified as the core success factors of the whole operation: 1) The President and the Commander-in-Chief, 2) The Secretary of Defense, 3) The Service Commanders, and 4) The Servicemen. All these levels were equally important and unique in the way that they helped bring about the success of the mission.
Servicepersons
If one needs an answer to the question, “Who fought the battle?,” clearly it is the brave men in our Armed Service. It was them who fought the actual battle, not the President, Defense Secretary, or the Service Commanders. Even General Fonseka never travelled beyond the Vanni (Vavuniya) and Jaffna (Palali) headquarters throughout the operation, except for ceremonial occasions. Therefore, if it was not for their commitment to the mission and their strong discipline and valor which allowed them to fight selflessly, none of those who try to claim ownership for the victory would be seen around today.
However, it should be not forgotten that these servicemen had been fighting the enemy for over 20 years without success. Even three Service Commanders and the Defense Secretary were once on the front lines. What made our Forces show a dramatic change in their performance within just three years? The answer to that question is something that all discernible citizens of this country must know without doubt. Yet, the answer would come with the sad truth that all Sri Lankans have to admit; our Forces always possessed the ability to defeat the enemy and we could have ended this misery a long time ago.
The Service Commanders
The Service Commanders were the three mainline authorities responsible for implementing operational plans. They were carefully selected to their roles purely based on their competencies. The authority that devised the grand strategy knew the behavior to expect from the three main operational commands and selected them accordingly, irrespective of their seniority or political views.
All three commanders played equally important roles in the success of the battle, though media attention was not equally given to their achievements. Where General Fonseka is concerned, one could say he was a well experienced General and an extremely ambitious individual who was, indeed, the perfect match to lead the Army through a mission that could not have been delayed any longer.
Yet he was far from perfect; he had no career prospects in the Army by the end of 2005. Though the writer does not wish to make further elaboration in this aspect, at least for the moment, it is quite clear that General Fonseka would have been another retired General unless his usefulness was correctly identified by the grand strategists of the national defense.
It is a generally accepted norm in the services that military commanders have to be officers and gentlemen. A skillful commander is essential to win a battle, but if he is only a gentleman if he can recognize the contribution of all and shares the credit with them. Unfortunately, General Fonseka’s tongue has never been flexible to thank the support he received from other services, particularly the Navy.
It was the Navy that destroyed the arms supply chain of the LTTE and enabled the Army to have a free reign on the ground in terms of weapons. If it were not for the effectiveness of the navy blockades, all senior LTTE leaders might now ve happily living in some foreign country.
The fact has already been established by the statements of KP that the LTTE could not ship any arms in or take its leaders out via sea due to the naval defense during the whole operation. On the other hand, it was the Air Force that paved the way for the Army in LTTE areas by neutralizing LTTE threats with effective bombing. Close air support, helicopter operations, casualty evacuation, and transportation were crucial for the Army’s success. Yes, it is the valiant soldiers who advanced into the LTTE dens and liberated the ground; but for the victory, all three Services made equal contributions. General Fonseka was at the helm of the Army, just like Admiral Karannagoda in the Navy and Air Chief Marshal Goonatilake in the Air Force.
As in the case of the Servicemen, all three Service Commanders during the humanitarian operation were not new recruits to the Forces. They had already completed 30 years in the services that failed to prevent a gang of murderers growing into the world’s most ruthless terrorist organization. None of them were charismatic commanders like Lt. General Kobbekaduwa, Maj. Gen. Wimalarathne, or Gen. Janaka Perera who had been known to the public for their battlefield successes, though they never became Service Commanders. What was the force that enabled the Service Commanders to achieve such tremendous success in their tenures? Clearly it was the same force that made them celebrities – that even enabled some to dream about the presidency in the country.
The President
When people of this country elected Mahinda Rajapaksa as their president, they made a very clear choice between two very distinct ideologies. One was characterized by pusillanimity and uncertainty, whereas the other was characterized by bold action and clarity.
Never in his campaign had President Rajapaksa tried to promote himself as a business genius, an economic savant, or an expert in international relations. He simply said he would free the future generation from the burden of terrorism. It was this compelling vision that made people believe in him and ultimately enabled him to do the impossible. Thus, the contribution of the President in the victory against terrorism was paramount.
President Rajapaksa was the only opponent in the whole team that the LTTE had not met before. He was the team leader, creator of the vision, and the only national leader out of five Sri Lankan Presidents that dealt with LTTE terrorism, who could convert his vision into action. He was the buffer against international pressures, master politician in bringing out political stability, and the leader who could unite the nation to believe in one single vision. He held the nation together amidst the global economic crisis, the increasing cost of living, and unprecedented political conspiracies. Above all, against all odds, he managed to start huge development programs in the country.
He is the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces or the top line authority of the whole operation. He headed the Security Council, sat with the top brass in defense every week, monitored the operational progress, reviewed plans, listened and understood the concerns of the defense officials, made bold decisions, solved problems, gave confidence and motivation, provided advice, and issued orders. In simple terms, he managed the whole operation. Thus, if one wants to answer to the question of who led the operation, it can be no one else but him – President Rajapaksa.
Yet, President Rajapaksa was not the only President who wanted to rid the country of terrorism. President JR Jayawardane tried hard, but failed miserably. It was during his time that the LTTE grew into a mass murdering terror outfit. President Premadasa took up the challenge to fight the LTTE, but had to pay the ultimate price for the wrong assumptions he made.
President Wijetunge took a bold stance against terrorism, but was not strong enough to convert his vision into action successfully. President Kumaratunge had to retire without an eye during her endeavor. How Prime Minister Ranil tried it is not even worth mentioning. A politician once considered to be a potential President ended up as a clown to the nation. How did President Rajapaksa outperform his predecessors in fighting terrorism? The answer is the bridge that helped him to link his vision with the action.
Defense Secretary
Having worked as a junior staff officer in the nation’s top most defense authority under two Presidents, the writer identifies one key factor that made the nation incapable of winning the war against terror for a quarter century. That was the lack of understanding between the executive power and the military. These are the two most important instruments of nation’s powers in the domain of national security.
During the early days of the conflict, both the executive and military brance were headed by barely Sri Lankan individuals who had very little understanding of the situation they were handling.
They spoke the same language, but it was foreign. They did not understand the root cause of the conflict and therefore the implications of their actions and lack of action(s). They failed to control the anti-Tamil riots in 1983, or the bloody village massacres by the terrorists. They could not stop LTTE bombings targeting civilians. In the writer’s view, they did not really care, for they never felt the pain.
Then came the era when the military started getting individuals with a better understanding of the situation to its top positions. Unfortunately, the executive remained the same and the two instruments of national power started distancing themselves. The executive learned to live with the war, whereas the military top brass withdrew to the comfort zone until they became mere “yes men.” The synergy of the effort between the two instruments was lost almost forever. There was no genuine interest in either party to win the war.
The most unfortunate scenario was how this distancing affected the military ranks. First the executive branch stopped participating in military functions, and then the service commanders were not to be seen even at officers’ passing out parades.
There was a time when the battle commanders had orders not to disturb the sleep of their respective Service Commanders even during military debacles. Helicopters were allocated to bring snacks from the Hilton to Trincomalee for the top defense officials’ meetings when soldiers were dying in battle without proper casualty evacuation. During President Kumaranatunge’s time, the Security Council meeting was the day that junior staff officers like the writer had to learn fasting since she always arrived six to seven hours late.
That was the kind of interest she had for national security. The Servicemen lost pride in their profession; they were called “broiler chickens” when they come home; it became a war that no one was interested in fighting.
The Vital Factor
The lengthy explanation above is considered necessary for an ordinary citizen to understand the most vital factor that enabled the Sri Lankan Armed Forces to achieve what was deemed impossible. It is the contribution made by Defence Secretary, Gotabaya Rajapaksa. He was certainly not only the one who created the vision and led the operation, but he was the grand strategist, the facilitator, advisor, and the man who looked after the people behind the weapons. Simply, he was the man who bridged the gap between the executive and military, and enabled the President to convert his vision into action.
He was the person who selected the Service Commanders, including General Fonseka, and even defended them during the difficult times they had. The key strategic decision, which was to destroy the LTTE with force, was taken even before General Fonseka was appointed Army Commander. He did the planning and made strategic decisions, and General Fonseka becoming Army Commander was just one of those decisions.
He being a battle-hardened soldier himself talked the same language of the soldiers. He being the brother of the President knew how to establish the two-way communication and trust between the two instruments of power. He knew the people commanding, and the weaknesses they had.
He supported their strengths and compensated for their weaknesses with his own strengths. He looked after the welfare of the war heroes, uplifted their morale, resurrected their pride, and made them confident that they where fighting an ending battle. The welfare programs he started for war heroes are unprecedented.
His scope of strategic planning for national security was very much wider and important than of an individual Armed Service. For instance, General Fonseka did not have a clue as to how the LTTE armada in the seas were tracked and destroyed, how the international pressures were handled, how LTTE propaganda was defeated, how the national intelligence was managed, etc.
Hence, if one wants the answer the question of who was the mastermind behind the success of the whole war effort, it is no one else but the Defense Secretary Rajapaksa himself. He was the factor that had not been there before with the previous Commanders-in-Chief who dealt with the LTTE. He was the man who outwitted Prabhakaran and his far more intelligent allies around the world and brought the terror Tigers to their feet.
Finally, it is an irony why General Fonseka is thinking that he is the only hero of this war and deserves more than the rest of the team. Maybe it is because of his ignorance of reality or something owing to his being pandered to the mean-spirited politicians who once sought to destroy him. He might have been engaged in a mission something like “Saving Private Ranil” even without his knowledge.
The writer still remembers the day when news of Prabhakarn’s death came to the Defense Ministry. It reached the Ministry even before it reached General Fonseka. When the writer inquired from the Defense Secretary whether to release the news, he had only one thing to say: “Let General Fonseka tell it to the nation on TV.” That was the kind of leadership Defense Secretary Rajapaksa gave to the team.
General Fonseka has been given what he really deserves. He was made Chief of Defense Staff, the senior most staff authority in the Armed Forces. Even the position of the Defense Secretary is a staff authority. General Fonseka’s desire to take the line authority of all three forces or to hold an appointment such as the “Three Forces Commander” is hilarious for any discernible military person.
Nevertheless, General Fonseka’s battle ended on the day that the LTTE leader died, but not for the rest of the team that he was once part of. If he thinks he can be the President by marketing his part of the contribution to war, the writer truly wishes him success. Yet, if he tries to cheat the people by beating others’ drums, it would be a serious mistake on his part. May he be wise enough not to make that mistake!
(”Et tu, Brute?” [pronounced and occasionally spelled "Et tu, Brut‚?"] translates to: “Even you, Brutus?”, or “And you, Brutus?” or “You too, Brutus?” or “You also, Brutus?” and is a Latin phrase often used poetically to represent the last words of Roman Emperor Julius Caesar. Immortalized by Shakespeare’s Julius Caesar, the quotation is widely used in Western culture as an epitome of betrayal).
Originally published on November 30, 2009 on the Daily News website.
Click here to access the original article.
